I Feel Your Pain: The Effect of Regulator as a Minority Shareholder on Merger and Acquisition Performance

We examine the effect of a regulator-led advocate for minority shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A) performance in China. In recent years, the China Securities Regulatory Commission established the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), which began its ownership of 100 shares of public firms in 2016. The CSISC advocates for the interests of minority shareholders proactively. Focusing on abnormal stock returns in M&A announcements, we find that acquirers that have the CSISC as a shareholder (CSISC acquirers) exhibit higher positive abnormal stock returns than non-CSISC acquirers. Cross-sectional analysis suggests that the core results are mainly driven by firms with severe agency problems and weak external/internal monitoring, and those not controlled by the state. In addition, we find that CSISC acquirers have better long-term performance and encounter more M&A failures than non-CSISC acquirers. Our findings indicate that although the CSISC only holds 100 shares of listed companies, it plays an effective role in monitoring and driving firms to make appropriate M&A decisions.     

Unleashing the Power of Networks: Shareholder Activism,Sustainable Development and Corporate Environmental Policy

In recent years, a new trend has emerged in which shareholder activists have formed networks to empower shareholders and magnify shareholder voices. This study explores the structural patterns and effectiveness of shareholder activism networks and shows how those networks affect corporate sustainability policies. We draw upon stakeholder influence theory, stakeholder network management theory and recent studies on activism networks to examine a shareholder activism network formed around environmental issues. The study found that (1) the structure of shareholder activist networks is largely driven by organizational attributes such as organization type, organizations’ human resources, media visibility and history; and (2) activist organizations with high centralities and eigenvector centralities enjoy more efficient results. This study contributes to our understanding of the business responses to shareholder demands on improving environmental performance and paves the way for future research on sustainable development through partnerships with shareholder networks. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Affiliated block shareholders and analyst optimism

We investigate several previously under-documented conflicts of interest that may result in analyst optimism by utilizing two unique features of brokerage firms in China, namely, the dominant ownership of large shareholders within the brokerage firms and the mandatory disclosure of brokerage firms’ commission income derived from each mutual fund client. We show that controlling shareholders of an analyst’s brokerage-firm put pressure on the analyst to report more optimistically biased earnings forecasts and recommendations to the stocks they hold larger positions in. We also find that the magnitude of analyst optimism increases with the shareholdings of the mutual funds that contribute commission fees to the analyst’s brokerage firm. These findings remain robust after incorporating a regulation change that reduces conflicts of interest in the brokerage industry and higher dimensional fixed effects, and thus are unlikely to be driven by reverse causality or omitted variable bias.     

混合股权制衡度与真实盈余管理行为

混合所有制改革形成了非国有股与国有股相互制衡的股权结构。通过研究国有企业中非国有股权和国有股权相互制衡的程度与真实盈余管理行为的关系发现：混合股权制衡度显著抑制了国有企业的真实盈余管理行为，但当国有性质股权占比小于非国有性质股权占比时上述抑制作用减弱。另外,参与混合所有制改革的金融类、外资类股权相比民营类股权制衡度，对真实盈余管理行为发挥了更显著的治理作用。机制检验发现，混合股权制衡一方面通过提升业绩，提高对真实盈余管理动机的抑制作用，从而缓解了真实盈余管理行为；另一方面通过提升内部控制对真实盈余管理的抑制作用，降低了真实盈余管理行为。以上结论有助于深化国有企业混合所有制改革，为提升混改中的审计监管质量提供参考。     

上市公司发放现金股利的价值效应——基于委托代理问题视角的实证研究

现金股利发放反映了债权人、股东、管理者之间的利益分配关系,现金股利的价值效应受到委托代理问题的影响。采用2008—2017年沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本,在委托代理理论的分析框架下实证检验我国上市公司发放现金股利的价值效应。研究表明,发放现金股利可能会损害债权人利益,过度债务公司发放现金股利的价值效应较小,而债务不足公司发放现金股利的价值效应较大。基于管理者代理问题视角的研究发现,现金股利可以有效发挥降低管理者代理成本的作用,当管理者代理问题严重时公司发放现金股利的价值效应更大。基于控股股东代理问题视角的实证结果表明,现金股利可以作为替代性的治理机制约束控股股东行为,当控股股东代理问题严重时现金股利具有更高的价值效应。     

论股东代表诉讼之判决既判力主观范围的扩张

股东代表诉讼判决既判力主观范围的扩张，包括向公司与其他股东二者的扩张。长期以来原告股东与公司的关系存在诉讼代理与诉讼担当之争，综合立法现状、制度渊源与改革成本等因素的考量，原告股东与公司的关系应定性为法定诉讼担当，从而为判决既判力向公司扩张提供正当理论支撑。但受制于股东代表诉讼前置程序形骸化，对原告股东起诉的正当性审查无从实现，公司与其他股东对于诉讼的获悉存在信息壁垒，由此应当通过诉讼告知程序为公司或其他股东作为有独立请求权第三人进入诉讼开辟通路。同时借由不起诉理由书与统一案件受理费等程序构建，作为其他股东进入诉讼的激励机制，进而为既判力的扩张提供有理性基础。     

标会的运行机理及政策建议

标会是一种入会会员之间通过对资金使用利息进行投标而决定资金使用先后顺序的互助会。本文在浙江省台州地区某市标会为例，在调查分析的基础上揭示了其运行机理，并提出控制标会等民间金融风险的政策思考。     

大股东合作与竞争关系的一个博弈分析

公司治理文献对所有者与经营者和大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突进行了广泛分析 ,但缺乏对大股东之间合作与竞争关系的研究。利用博弈理论 ,本文对大股东合作与竞争的可能性进行了理论分析。分析表明 :对于最大化自己收益的大股东而言 ,对长期收益和控制权潜在收益考虑得越多 ,则他们之间进行合作的可能性也越大 ,而相互竞争或不合作的可能性越小。所以 ,对于上市公司和宏观管理机构而言 ,鼓励大股东进行真诚合作并防止他们通过合谋而损害中小股东利益是十分必要的。     

浅谈我国资产评估管理中存在的若干问题及相应对策

从经济学角度系统分析资产评估业现状及其存在的弊病，使之适应市场经济发展的要求，成为真正履行独立、客观、公正原则的，具有国际水平的社会中介服务行业。     

大股东资金占用与盈余管理

本文以深沪两市2000-2002年所有A股公司作为样本,研究了大股东的资金侵占与上市公司盈余管理的关系。实证结果表明,大股东及其附属公司对上市公司的资金侵占越严重,上市公司进行盈余管理的程度越高,说明大股东的资金占用不仅可能影响上市公司的经营业绩,还会降低上市公司会计信息质量。